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POLICING THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
In many instances presidential administrations have claimed an
"executive privilege" to withhold from Congress testimony or
written information requested of members of the executive
branch.1 Recently, this privilege has become the focus of consid-
erable controversy. During its deliberations on the foreign mili-
tary assistance bill, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
requested the Nixon administration to supply certain information
on long-range plans for foreign military aid. President Nixon
refused, contending that the requested information involved only
"tentative planning data" and to provide such "internal working
documents" to the Committee would not be in the public in-
terest. 2 In like manner, the United States Information Agency
refused to supply the Committee with memoranda used in drafting
the Agency's budget. Emphasizing that the refusal was the result
of an "executive decision," the Director of the Agency argued
I When in 1792 Congress inquired into the failure of an expedition by General St. Clair
in the Northwest Territory, President Washington at first refused to supply certain docu-
ments on the ground that they were of a secret nature. Later, in 1796, when he denied
Congress access to papers used in the negotiations of the Jay Trerty, President Washing-
ton said:
"as it is essential to the due administration of the government that the
boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different departments
should be preserved, a just regard to the Constitution and to the duty of my
office... forbids a compliance with yout request."
Hearings on S. 1!25 Before the Subcomm. on the Separation of Powers of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 429-30 (1971) (statement of Mr. Rehnquist, quoting
from I J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 196 (1907)) [herer
inafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
During the trial of Aaron Burr, President Jefferson frustrated the subpoena of Chief
Justice Marshall by not permitting certain officers of his administration to testify. Berger,
Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1044, 1103 & nn.316-
17 (1965).
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower used the executive privilege frequently. Although
the House Committee on Education and Labor twice subpoenaed John Steelman, an
assistant to President Truman, on the orders of the President he refused to appear because
of his duties as a confidential advisor. For similar reasons Sherman Adams, an assistant to
President Eisenhower, refused to testify before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Mo-
nopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 1971 Hearings 474 (statement of Secretary of
State Rogers).
President Kennedy once directed the Secretaries of Defense and State not to disclose
names of certain officials during a congressional investigation of military cold war educa-
tion and speech review policies. In a letter to the Secretaries, he stated:
"It would not be possible for you to maintain an orderly Department and
receive the candid advice and loyal respect of your subordinates if they,
instead of you and your senior associates, are to be individually answerable
to the Congress, as well as to you, for their internal acts and advice."
1971 Hearings 433 (statement of Mr. Rehnquist, quoting from an unidentified letter of
President Kennedy.)2 N.Y. Times, Sept. I, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
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that the documents were unevaluated working papers that did not
represent official policy.3 In both instances, the administration
relied upon the executive privilege in refusing to disclose the
information.
No case has authoritatively determined the extent to which
Congress may compel the production of testimony or documents
from the executive branch of government, 4 and thus the con-
stitutional status of the executive privilege remains unclear.5 Nev-
ertheless, advocates of the privilege assert that the discretionary
power of an administration to withhold information or testimony,
although not explicitly authorized by the Constitution, is an im-
plicit presidential prerogative based upon the constitutional doc-
trine of separation of powers. 6 On the other hand, critics of the
privilege assert that separation of powers entitles Congress to
secure all information necessary to the performance of its legisla-
tive function.
7
In response to the increasing number of confrontations over the
3 N.Y. Times, March 21, 1972, at 13, col. 1.
4 One reason advanced for the lack of litigation in this area has been the historical
absence of conflict between legislative and executive branches of government. The two
branches of government have emphasized cooperation, albeit an often tenuous coopera-
tion. 1971 Hearings 421.
5 The executive privilege is replete with constitutional issues. At the threshold is the
question of whether there is a constitutional basis for the privilege. There appears to be
general agreement that the privilege is implicit in the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. Nevertheless there is no clear Supereme Court decision to that-effect. Other
constitutional issues are briefly discussed in note 24 infra.
For a thorough analysis of the constitutionality of executive privilege, see Berger, note I
supra. See also Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957).
6 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952), is usually cited as judicial support for
the executive privilege. In that case the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the
President to withhold information from compulsory subpoena. While serving as Assistant
Attorney General, William Rehnquist noted that although Reynolds is not a carte blanche
for executive privilege, "the Court's description of the extent of judicial review of the
propriety of the claim indicates that such a review would be a narrow one." 1971 Hearings
421.
7 In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), the Supreme Court held that a
witness could be placed in custody to insure that he would appear when subpoenaed to
testify before a Senate investigatory committee. The Court found that the power to
legislate implies the power to subpoena and requires testimony from witnesses in order to
obtain information necessary to carry out the legislative function.
Senator Ervin has interpreted McGrain to mean that Congress is entitled to "adequate
information" for the exercise of its legislative powers and duties. 1971 Hearings 418.
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist conceded that the case stands for that proposition,
stating that "the power to legislate implies the power to obtain information necessary for
Congress to inform itself about the subject to be legislated, in order that the legislative
function may be exercised effectively and intelligently." 1971 Hearings 421.
Nevertheless, the case did not involve the use of the executive privilege, and the Court
was not required to balance the need of the Congress to receive enough information to
legislate and the need of the executive branch to protect the privacy of its internal
deliberations. Therefore, the decision does not clarify the constitutional status of the
privilege.
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use of the executive privilege, 8 Senator William Fulbright has
placed before the Senate a bill 9 designed to avoid the confusion
that now exacerbates the tension between the legislative and
executive branches of government. This relatively uncomplicated
bill defines procedures for the assertion of the executive privilege
and provides sanctions to be imposed when these procedures are
abused or ignored.' 0 This note reviews the nature of the con-
troversy between the two branches of government which has
contributed to the introduction of the proposed legislation, and
then proceeds to examine the provisions of the bill.
I. THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY
The controversy over the executive privilege is a manifestation
of the fundamental conflict between the need of Congress for
information essential to the performance of its legislative function
and the desire of the executive branch to conduct its internal
deliberations without undue disruption. The controversy involves
three separate issues. The first is when may the privilege be
invoked to withhold from Congress information requested of the
executive branch; more precisely, what types of information may
be withheld, and under what circumstances. The second is who in
the executive branch may invoke the privilege. And the third
issue is how may the privilege be invoked, that is, what is the
appropriate procedure for these members of the executive branch
to follow when they choose to withhold requested information
from Congress.
Institutional modifications have heightened the conflict between
8 In addition to the controversies involving the foreign military assistance program and
the United States Information Agency budget (see text accompanying notes 2-3 supra),
the executive and legislative branches of government have clashed over executive privi-
lege in such diverse situations as whether Presidential Assistant and National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger can refuse to testify before congressional committees, and
whether the Congress is entitled to receive briefings from the Central Intelligence Agency
similar to those furnished the President. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1971, at 2, col. 2.
9S. 1125, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. 11251. The bill as
originally introduced on March 5, 1971, contained only section 306. Amendments in-
troduced on July 29, 1971, added section 307.
10 Some observers believe that the limits of the privilege, whatever they may be, have
been abused in the past. Senator Fulbright has stated that although executive privilege in
its contemporary form was born honorably out of an intent to protect officials of the
executive branch from personal attack, it has developed into something else:
a highly effective means of nullifying the investigatory function of Congress.
In neither logic, law, or practice can there exist simultaneously an effective
power of legislative oversight and an absolute executive discretion to with-
hold information. Inevitably, one must give way to the other and the only




the needs of Congress and the desires of the executive branch."'
In recent decades there has been an obvious shift in the relative
powers of the legislative and executive branches. An example of
this shift is the tendency toward the use of executive agreements
where a formal treaty requiring approval of the Senate would
formerly have been deemed necessary. 12 There has also been a
reorientation of the decision-making process within the executive
branch itself. The most notable instance of this change involves
the increased responsibilities which the President has given to his
"personal advisors." The large staffs and budgets which such
advisors now oversee have led observers to conclude that these
officials have become de facto agency chiefs who should not in
every instance be immune from congressional demands for testi-
mony.13
The administration's increased use of lower level officials to
testify at congressional hearings and investigations has also in-
tensified the controversy. Often such officials are not authorized
to answer questions that are posed, or, more often, they may
simply not know the answer.' 4 Further, whether lower level
officials may constitutionally invoke the executive privilege with-
out specific presidential authorization is unclear.
15
11 A respected public official has suggested that the institutional conflict between legisla-
ture and executive can be intensified by continuing disagreements between the members of
both branches. 1971 Hearings 263-68 (remarks of Mr. Acheson).
12 1971 Hearings 268 (remarks of Prof. Kurland).
13 Traditionally, personal advisors to Presidents have claimed a blanket immunity from
congressional demands for testimony on the ground that everything they say or do in their
unique role as presidential confidants is properly covered by the executive privilege and
thus is at all times immune from inquiry.
However, a former advisor to President Johnson, George Reedy, testified:
I do not think that a man who is in control of some 140 people, with 40 of
them being very substantive people indeed and the others being various types
of clerical help and clerical support, is any longer a personal advisor. He is a
man who is administering policy, who is administering it on the somewhat
impersonal staff level that at one point we would have expected from the
State Department ....
1971 Hearings 457.
14 1971 Hearings 322-23 (remarks of Mr. Bundy).
As a General Accounting Office official notes of that office's experience:
The response we usually get at the working level is that they do not have the
authority to release them, and they will have to clear it with higher headquar-
ters. And this just starts up the chain until it gets back to the Pentagon and
State Department. No; they don't actually refuse us access; we just don't get
it.
1971 Hearings 315 (remarks of Mr. Duff).
Is President Nixon has seemingly precluded executive employees from using the privi-
lege without his direct authorization. On March 24, 1969, he issued the following memo-
randum:
The policy of this Administration is to comply to the fullest extent possible
with Congressional requests for information. While the Executive branch has
the responsibility of withholding certain information the disclosure of which
SPRING 19721
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Advocates of the executive privilege argue that disclosure of
staff level discussions can often be damaging to the policy-making
process, especially in the area of foreign affairs, and with respect
to this policy-making apparatus even more protection is needed
for documents and opinions than is now available. 16 Those who
advocate the privilege believe that by embracing the concept of
separation of powers the framers of the Constitution recognized
the need for private deliberations to facilitate the formulation of
government policy. 17
The legislation proposed by Senator Fulbright recognizes the
several aspects of the controversy and attempts to accommodate
the interests of both the legislative and executive branches of
government. As Senator Fulbright himself has said, the function
of the bill.
is not to eliminate but to restrict the practice of "executive
privilege," by reducing it to bounds in which it will cease to
interfere with the people's rights to know and the Congress's
duty to investigate and oversee the execution of the laws. 18
Thus, despite the warnings of its detractors, 19 the bill has modest
ambitions. It does not place any restraints upon the information
that the administration may claim as privileged. Indeed, rather
than control the invocation of the privilege, the bill only regulates
the procedures to be followed when the executive branch decides
to use it.
would be incompatible with the public interest, this Administration will
invoke this authority only in the most compelling circumstances and after a
rigorous inquiry into the actual need for its exercise. For those reasons
Executive privilege will not be used without specific Presidential approval.
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Establishing a
Procedure to Govern Compliance with Congressional Demands for Information), March
24, 1969, in 1971 Hearings 36-37.
The constitutional aspect of who may assert the privilege is briefly discussed in note 24
infra.
16 1971 Hearings 320. Senator Ervin has noted that the executive branch often hesitates
to send information to Congress on the ground that it is not in the public interest to make
the documents available. The Senator points out, however, that information in the hands of
congressional committees does not mean it will necessarily become public information.
1971 Hearings 244.
17 Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist asserted that any intrusion into the deliber-
ations of the executive branch would be a "departure from the distribution of powers
contemplated by the Constitution .... He further argued that the President must face the
electorate at the end of his four-year term to justify his action, and given that critical
review, he should be entitled to faithful and confidential advice from his subordinates.
1971 Hearings 425.
18 1971 Hearings 20.
19 See note 17 supra.
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II. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Invoking the Privilege
The proposed legislation provides that no employee 20 of the
executive branch may refuse to appear before a congressional
committee 2' on the ground that he intends to assert the executive
privilege. Prior notice to the committee that any employee intends
to invoke the privilege is not sufficient to excuse an appearance
before a committee. 22 Any employee who wishes to invoke the
privilege may do so only if he appears before the committee and
produces a statement signed by the President requiring the em-
ployee to assert the privilege and deny access to the information
sought. 23 Thus the bill is apparently premised upon the assump-
tion that any constitutional power to assert the executive privilege
is limited to the President himself and may not be delegated to
other officials in the executive branch.
24
The requirement that all witnesses must appear before the
congressional committee irrespective of whether they intend to
invoke the executive privilege is an attempt to prevent executive
branch employees from summarily refusing to respond to all ques-
tions posed by the committee. Since any information for which
the privilege is claimed would be precisely identified by the ques-
tion posed at the hearing, there would be no confusion as to what
information is being claimed as privileged and the possibility of
taking an "informal privilege," that is, merely ignoring the
20 S. 1125, § 307(b)(2) defines "employee" as "(A) an employee in or under an agency;
and (B) a member of the uniformed services." For the definition of "agency," see note 32
infra.
21 The bill generally applies to requests for testimony and written information from the
executive branch by Congress, any joint committee, committee, or subcommittee thereof,
as well as the General Accounting Office. S. 1125, § 307(c). The term "committee" is used
in this note to encompass all of these bodies.
22 Id. § 306(a).
23 Id. 88 306(b), 307(d).
24 Assuming the existence of the privilege, a constitutional question immediately arises
as to who may assert it. The privilege may either be personal to the President or available
to him as well as others in the executive branch. Again, there is no Supreme Court
decision resolving the issue. Nevertheless, it seems that if the privilege is available to the
President as well as others in the executive branch, the proposed legislation, by limiting
assertion of the privilege to the President, may be viewed as an unconstitutional attempt
by Congress to limit the rights of the executive branch. Even if the privilege is personal to
the President, however, there is another constitutional question that must be considered:
whether the President may delegate to others in the executive branch the power to assert
the privilege. If the President may so delegate the privilege, then arguably the Fulbright
bill, by recognizing the privilege only when asserted under the signature of the President, is
unconstitutional.
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request, would necessarily be curtailed. 25 Although the procedure
might be more efficient if Congress would accept a written state-
ment from the President that a witness would be required to
invoke the privilege should he appear, 26 prospective witnesses
presumably possess information for which the privilege would not
be claimed, but which would never be discovered if no appear-
ance were made. The requirement that an appearance be made,
therefore, has sufficient fact-finding potential to outweight this
possible inefficiency.
The bill establishes a procedure for executive employees to
obtain a statement of the President invoking the privilege. 27 When
an employee receives a request for information from a committee,
the head of the agency in which he is employed must determine
whether there is a strong need to invoke the executive privilege,
and if there is, he is required to inform the committee immediate-
ly. He must then confer with the Attorney General concerning the
question of whether to seek invocation of the privilege by the
President. 28 The agency head and the Attorney General have
thirty days to reach a decision and must either present the re-
quested information to the committee or refer the matter to the
President.29 If the matter is referred to the President, he too has
thirty days either to invoke the privilege, in which case he must
set forth his reasons in writing, or to make the information imme-
diately available to the committee.30
The proposed legislation delineates the nature of the in-
formation to which Congress may demand access. Information
under the custody of any government agency is to be made
available to the extent necessary for Congress to
exercise, in an informed manner, the authority conferred
upon it by article I of the Constitution to make laws neces-
sary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested in
the Congress and all other powers vested in that government
or any department of office thereof.31
25 Professor Swan of the University of Chicago identified the anticipated effect of the
bill on use of the "informal privilege." He suggests that by requiring the executive official
to appear at a hearing, the committee forces him to defend precisely the grounds on which
he thinks the privilege should be based. If, in fact, the privilege is based on a matter of
"internal opinion and advice and part of the internal deliberative process," then that basis
will be respected and the privilege recognized. 1971 Hearings 252.
26 1971 Hearings 354 (remarks of Mr. Harriman).
27 S. 1125, § 307(e).
2 8 Id. § 307(e)(1).
29 Id. § 307(e)(2). The bill fails to provide for the possibility that the agency head and the
Attorney General may not agree on the proper course of action. In the event that these
parties reach an impasse, the matter would most likely be referred to the President.
30 Id. § 307(e)(3).
31 Id. § 307(a).
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Although this statement asserts no new congressional power, it at
least expresses in statutory form the position of the legislative
branch with regard to the executive privilege. The bill puts the
executive branch of government on notice that Congress demands
access to all information necessary to conduct its legislative func-
tion.
B. Sanction
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the bill is the sanc-
tion it establishes. If the information is not released or the
privilege formally invoked in writing within the sixty day statutory
period, all funding of the agency 32 involved will be terminated
seventy days after the employee of the agency first received the
request. Thereafter, funding will resume only when the President
personally invokes the privilege or the information is made avail-
able to the committee. 33 Presumably, the ten day gap between the
expiration of the sixty day period and the funding halt on the
seventieth day is a grace period during which the President can
reconsider his decision and preparations can be made to stop the
flow of funds.
From the congressional perspective, the proposed sanction no
doubt reflects the frustration congressmen experience in attempt-
ing to secure needed information.3 4 However, the sanction is
heavy-handed and has been the subject of widespread criticism.
35
Some contend that such a harsh measure would create an initially
antagonistic and hostile situation where one need not necessarily
exist,3 6 while others argue that the sanction would never be an
effective deterrent, since Congress would be reluctant to use so
drastic a measure.3 7
An alternative enforcement procedure would refer all questions
of non-compliance to the courts. The judiciary could order the
executive to produce any information when the privilege is not
32 Id. § 307(b)(1) defines "agency" as "(A) an executive agency; (B) a military depart-
ment; and (C) the government of the District of Columbia."
I d. § 307(f).
a'When congressional requests are submitted to an agency they may be transferred
from official to official. It is impractical for Congress to identify the source of any resulting
delay.
35 For example, Representative Moss, although strongly opposed to the executive privi-
lege, does not believe that the termination of funds is an adequate solution. While he is
certain Congress has the power to invoke such a measure, he has termed it "a very far
fetched thing to do." 1971 Hearings 336. See also id. at 362 (remarks of Mr. Harriman).
36 1971 Hearings 379 (remarks of Mr. Dorsen).
37 Id. at 380.
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invoked in the proper statutory method.3 8 In any event, Senator
Fulbright agrees that the bill is not a final solution and that the
courts must be the source of the ultimate answers. Speaking of the
impact of the bill in general, he said:
Even if this legislation is enacted, we will have to accept the
principle that the question of whether the President in any
given instance has asserted executive privilege reasonably or
arbitrarily would be a judicial question.3 9
Perhaps closer to the spirit of the legislation is the suggestion
by the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers that rather than suspend the agency's funding on
non-compliance, Congress should reduce the number of top-grade
administrative positions in an agency or department by one-half.40
That would allow the agency to continue functioning while placing
rather direct pressure on those top-level officials in the depart-
ment who would most likely control the information. But to
reduce the number of key executive personnel or to suspend
funding of agencies like the State or Defense Department is an
awkward tool for enforcing congressional policy and would be
surely as damaging to the interests of Congress and the nation as
to the executive branch of government. The strength of either
approach must rest more in the threat of its execution rather than
in its actual application. The resulting paradox is, however, that
the credibility of such a drastic threat would be so low as to make
it ineffective, and the only way to raise that credibility would be
periodically to execute the threatened action. Crude as such mea-
sures may be, Congress can make them effective by clearly show-
ing its resolve to use them when necessary.
C. Personal Advisors
Another issue that has sparked much of the past controversy
over executive privilege is the ability of presidential personal
advisors to avoid testifying before congressional hearings on the
ground that as personal confidants of Presidents, their advice
should not be subject to inquiry. 41 Senator Fulbright's bill does
38 For a discussion of whether a dispute between the executive and legislative branches
of government concerning the executive privilege is a justiciable issue, see Berger, supra
note i, at 1333-60. He contends that such a dispute is a justiciable "case or controversy,"
and concludes that the general conflict over the executive privilege can be finally resolved
only in the courts.
39 1971 Hearings 211.
40 Id. at 380.
41 See note 13 supra.
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not specifically exempt personal advisors from its provisions, yet
even the Senator admits that "[n]o one questions the propriety or
desirability of allowing the President to have confidential, person-
al advisors." 42 Observers have called for an amendment which
would recognize this relationship. 43 The most difficult aspect of
this problem arises in attempting to distinguish between strictly
personal advisors and the department chiefs who oversee large,
operational agencies. The position of Henry Kissinger as an advi-
sor to President Nixon with a sizable and important staff ex-
emplifies the problem. A former advisor to President Johnson has
suggested that the President alone should make the distinction;
although he admits that such a policy would give the President
complete control over who might be exempt from congressional
inquiry, he sees no alternative. 44
However, if the bill were to exempt executive branch employ-
ees whom the President classifies as personal advisors, the ba-
sic objectives of the bill might be undermined. If the President
wished to extend personal advisor status to lower level executive
employees who control information, they would be protected from
congressional inquiries. Congress would be providing a loophole
which it could not close without further legislation. No doubt
Senator Fulbright recognized this situation in designing the bill
without a formal personal advisor exclusion, because he declared
in introducing his legislation:
No one questions the propriety of executive privilege un-
der certain circumstances; what is and must be contested is
the contention that the President alone may determine the
range of its application and, in so doing, also determine the
range of the Congress' power to investigate. 45
D. Criticism and Alternative Solutions
The strongest critics of executive privilege argue that the bill
provides precedent and statutory strength for a privilege whose
legitimacy is still a matter of doubt.46 For example, Representa-
42 1971 Hearings 21.
43 Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has called for an amendment to the bill which
would recognize the confidential nature of the relationship between the President and his
personal staff. He noted that this relationship is common to staffs in all three branches of
the federal government and thus is not just an "executive" privilege. 1971 Hearings 339.
See also id. at 427 (remarks of Mr. Rehnquist).
4Id. at 460 (remarks of Mr. Reedy). Admitting the existence of the privilege, Mr.
Reedy notes "I do not mind conceding it too much, simply because I do not think there is
anything that can be done about it."
45 1971 Hearings 3 1.
46See note 5 supra.
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tive Moss has stated that executive privilege is an "arrogant claim
of the President of the United States" and Congress should refuse
to recognize it.4 7 More specifically, critics object to the bill be-
cause it allows the President absolute discretion in deciding
whether grounds for the invocation of the privilege exist. 48 They
would permit the use of the executive privilege only insofar as it is
necessary to protect executive branch employees from inquiries
into the substance of their confidential advice to superiors.
49
Without this protection, employees may be less willing to offer
their candid opinions on issues facing the executive branch of
government.
Some of those persons who object to executive privilege are
willing to accept its statutory recognition because the bill shifts
the duty of deciding whether to invoke the privilege from
low-ranking officials to the President, and thereby eliminates the
delaying tactics often used in lieu of executive privilege.50
Insofar as it suggests that the executive branch is concealing
information from the electorate, too frequent use of the executive
privilege can be damaging to an administration's public image.
Therefore, the provision forcing the decisions to the top ranks of
the administration is one of the major strengths of the bill. High
level political appointees, who under the bill would be forced to
seek a written authorization of the President in order to invoke
the privilege, are less likely to want to use the privilege than more
politically immune civil servants because of the potentially bad
public image it may create. 51 Additionally, restricting the use of
the privilege to the President will remove a major source of
47 1971 Hearings 332. Proponents of the legislation-critics themselves of executive
privilege-respond that it is somewhat late to be arguing whether or not the right of
executive privilege exists. As Deputy Comptroller General of the United States Robert
Keller notes, the bill "assumes the fact of its existence and realistically makes an effort to
restrict its exercise to the President or by his written direction." 1971 Hearings 308.
48 1971 Hearings 364-65 (remarks of Mr. Dorsen).
49 Id. at 365.
50 1971 Hearings 308 (remarks of Mr. Keller). Mr. Keller also expressed some doubt
whether executive privilege should be recognized as such by statute, but finally acquiesced
in the bill's approach, because "at least from our viewpoint it would cut out the delaying
tactics, and the decisions not to disclose records being made at a lower level." 1971
Hearings 310.
51 1971 Hearings 337 (remarks of Prof. Winter). Representatives of the executive
branch seem to be satisfied with such a provision. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk
believes that it is only good judgment for a President not to delegate such decisions in
order to be "personally in touch with the constitutional relationships between himself and
the Congress." 1971 Hearings 340.
Similarly, former Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy sees the effect of the bill
as being "to tighten and stiffen" the manner in which the executive branch deals with
congressional requests, "so that you don't get captious or self-protecting invocations of the
privilege, but you do get clear lines, and everybody would understand what you were
doing." 1971 Hearings 327.
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irritation among congressional staffs and officials-the blockage of
information by inaccessible, lower level executive employees.
52
Alternate solutions beyond this proposed legislation are as nu-
merous as the complaints about the executive privilege itself. One
critic has suggested that existing laws can be easily modified to
control any abuse of discretion. 53 Others believe that Congress
can best limit these abuses by presiding over a complete revision
of the procedures that determine which information will be "clas-
sified." 54 Finally, it has been suggested that the entire focus of the
executive privilege should be changed to the problem of advice
privilege. Proponents of this view believe that there is no basis,
constitutional or otherwise, for giving the executive branch a
special privilege. Rather, new legislation should fashion the privi-
lege as a means to protect all confidential advice, whether given to
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch.5 5 This position fails
to recognize that while all branches do have communications
which need protection, the executive branch controls more in-
formation of this nature than the other branches. For this reason,
the terms for the use of the privilege by the executive branch must
be clearly articulated.
III. CONCLUSION
Despite its onerous sanction, the proposed legislation repre-
sents a reasoned approach to the executive privilege. In no way
does the bill prohibit assertion of the privilege, rather it merely
establishes a well-defined procedure for the executive branch to
respond to congressional requests for information. If enacted, the
bill would surely serve to relieve the tension that now exists
between the executive and legislative branches of government.
The measure would eliminate unnecessary delay in executive
52 Prof. Ralph Winter, consultant for the Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers,
expressed this irritation by saying that
the previous practices of lower officials in invoking executive privilege have
been superceded by a practice of their just refusing to divulge the information
without specifically mentioning executive privilege. Executive privilege is
alive and well in the discretion of lower officials.
1971 Hearings 337.
53 Prof. Berger suggested that a 1928 statute, 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (1970), could be amended
to provide adequate protection for the Congress. As presently drafted, the statute requires
the executive agency to furnish the House or Senate Committees on Government Oper-
ations all information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the
committee. By changing the statute to include requests by all congressional committees,
Congress would theoretically have all needed information at its disposal. 1971 Hearings
288- 89. However, the ambiguity as to what relates to a matter within the jurisdiction of a
committee would doubtless result in frequent controversy and litigation.
111971 Hearings 322 (remarks of Mr. Bundy).
55 1971 Hearings 365 (remarks of Mr. Dorsen).
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response to requests for information, and would discourage eva-
sion of such requests by lower echelon executive employees.
Shifting the focus of the executive privilege to the politically most
sensitive official, the President, would certainly effect a more
responsible use of the privilege.
To the extent that the bill is an attempt to respond to a larger
tension between the executive and legislative branches, that is, an
attempt by Congress to maintain a position equal to and com-
petitive with the executive, the bill will fall short of its goal, for it
is doubtful whether any legislation can return to Congress its once
central position in the federal structure. The bill can achieve only
the more limited goal of easing that tension between these
branches of government which is traceable to the executive privi-
lege. In any event, the ultimate success of the bill will depend
upon the commitment of Congress and the executive branch to a
spirit of cooperation, not competition, in performing their assigned
functions of government.
- Keith Borman
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